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AUSTRALIA’S EQUITY HOME BIAS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
1 Introduction 
The traditional international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) based on Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) predicts that investors should hold equities from countries around the globe in 
proportion to world market capitalisation. However, empirical facts suggest that international 
portfolios are heavily biased towards domestic assets (French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1994), Tesar and Werner (1995), Ahearne et al. (2004)). This phenomenon is termed 
as “home bias” and it can be defined as the situation where investors hold far too high a share 
of their wealth in domestic securities compared with the optimal share predicted by the 
traditional theory of portfolio choice. For instance, the actual domestic equity holding of 
Australia in 2002 was 81.67% whereas the ICAPM benchmark percentage was 1.84.  
 
The empirical investigation into the home bias puzzle is important for several reasons. First, 
one of the major problems in the research on home bias has been relatively poor quality of data 
on cross border holdings. In the past, the cross border holdings were estimated using 
accumulated capital flows and valuation adjustments (Tesar and Werner (1995)). Warnock and 
Cleaver (2002) show that capital flows data are ill suited to estimate bilateral holdings. This 
paper contributes to the existing literature by employing the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF’s) Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset on bilateral equity holdings 
for the years 2001 to 2005. CPIS reports data on foreign portfolio asset holdings (divided into 
equity, long term debt, and short term debt) by residence of issuer. In 1997, IMF conducted the 
first CPIS wherein 29 countries participated; the next survey was conducted in 2001 wherein 
69 countries participated and now CPIS is being conducted on an annual basis.  
 
Second, there are several papers investigating the home bias puzzle related to individual 
countries viz. Japan (Kang and Stulz (1997)), Sweden (Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001)), 
Korea (Kim and Wei (2002)) and United States (Ahearne et al (2004), Dahlquist et al (2003)). 
Mishra and Daly (2006) and Mishra (2007) study Australia’s cross border portfolio investment 
using CPIS data. There is no study that exclusively focuses on Australia’s equity home bias. 
This is the first study that focuses exclusively on Australia’s equity home bias. 
 
Third, traditional studies on home bias assume that portfolio investors can hold world market 
portfolio. However, Dahlquist et al (2003) state that portfolio investors can only hold the float 
adjusted world market portfolio i.e. world portfolio of shares not held by insiders. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature on home bias, by constructing float adjusted measure of 
Australia’s home bias for the years 2001 to 2005. Fourth, optimal insider ownership depends 
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on institutions that support corporate governance in a country as well as on the risks of 
predation by state. Home bias will tend to reduce in countries whose institutions support 
decentralized ownership. This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the 
impact of host countries’ legal and governance environment on Australia’s home bias. Fifth, 
this paper also empirically investigates the role of direct barriers viz. transaction costs; 
information asymmetries arising due to culture (language, legal origin) and  proximity 
(distance); and control variables viz. trade links, historical risk adjusted returns and covariance 
on Australia’s equity home bias. Sixth, overall this paper fills in the gap by empirically 
investigating the phenomenon of home bias in the Australian context; which is critical to 
understanding international portfolio positions and capital flows. 
 
This paper provides answers to the following questions: Which factors are important in 
explaining Australia’s equity home bias? Are factors related to culture and proximity important 
in explaining Australia’s equity home bias? Do trade linkages provide explanation for 
Australia’s equity home bias? Do share trading costs associated with destination countries’ 
stock exchanges affect Australia’s equity home bias? Do destination countries’ legal and 
governance environments influence Australia’s equity home bias? Do investors’ diversification 
motives primarily influence Australia’s equity home bias? 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides literature review of the home bias 
puzzle. Section 3 describes float adjusted measure of home bias. Section 4 describes the 
determinants of home bias and presents some stylized facts. Section 5 provides empirical 
specification. Section 6 describes the empirical results and finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) develop a two country capital market equilibrium model where 
there are barriers to cross border investment and these barriers can be considered as tax on net 
foreign investment. This tax represents various kinds of barriers to international investment 
such as direct controls on the import or export of capital, possibility of expropriation of foreign 
holdings, reserve requirements on bank deposits and other assets held by foreigners, 
restrictions on the fraction of business that is owned by foreigners. It may also include barriers 
due to information asymmetries i.e. unfamiliarity of residents of one country with the stock 
markets of other countries. Merton (1987) develops a model where investors hold stocks that 
they know. In this model, investors think that the risk of stocks they do not know is extremely 
high. Accordingly, the investors may overweight domestic stocks. Cooper and Lessard (1981) 
develop an international capital market equilibrium model which allows for differential taxes 
on foreign investment depending on the country of investment and the origin of investor. They 
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obtain unique solutions for taxes under extreme assumptions that taxes depend on the country 
of investment, or on the origin of investor. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) find that hedging 
against inflation risk cannot explain the home bias.   
 
Several papers consider the effect of indirect barriers i.e. information asymmetries on equity 
investment and home bias. French and Poterba (1991), for instance, find that information 
asymmetry can generate the same observed portfolio patterns as if investors expect the 
domestic returns to be several hundred basis points higher than the returns in foreign markets. 
Gehrig (1993) uses a noisy rational expectations model to investigate the effect of asymmetric 
information between domestic and foreign investors. Investors observe noisy signals with 
different degrees of precision. Domestic investors receive signals of future returns that are 
more precise. Investors remain incompletely informed, even in equilibrium. Domestic bias 
arises from better investor information about domestic stocks. Thus, on average foreign 
investments appear to be more risky. Hasan and Simaan (2000) derive the premium that an 
investor is willing to pay to buy the full information of the mean return vector and show that 
rational investors prefer home country dominated portfolios over diversified portfolios if the 
variability of estimation errors far exceeds the variability of the mean return vector. Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show that the weight of a US stock in US mutual funds is negatively 
related to the distance between the location of the fund and the location of the headquarters of 
the firm. The mutual fund managers do better with their holdings of stocks of firms located 
more closely to where the mutual fund is located. Portes et al (2001) find that information 
asymmetries are responsible for the strong negative relationship between asset trade and 
distance. They investigate the roles of explicit information variables, as well as distance, in 
explaining separately cross-border trade in corporate equities, corporate bonds, and 
government bonds. Portes and Rey (2005) explore a new panel data set on bilateral gross cross-
border equity flows between 14 countries, for a period from 1989 to 1996. They show that 
gross transaction flows depend on market size in source and destination country as well as 
trading costs, in which both information and the transaction technology play a role. In their 
model, distance proxies some information costs, and other variables explicitly represent 
information transmission, an information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors, 
and the efficiency of transactions. They find that the geography of information is the main 
determinant of the pattern of international transactions, while there is weak support for 
diversification motive, in their data, once they control for the information friction. Sarkissian 
and Schill (2004) find that geographic, economic, cultural, and industrial proximity play a 
dominant role in the selection of overseas listing stock exchange. Their findings imply that 
proximity constraints that lead to home bias in investment portfolio decisions are similar to 
those which influence financing decisions.  
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For Japan, Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign investors concentrate on equity investments 
in firms that are large; firms that export more and firms with good accounting performance. 
For Sweden, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find that non-resident investors are mostly 
institutional investors and that the holdings of stocks by non-resident investors exhibit biases 
that are also typical of resident institutional investors. Their findings are consistent with Kang 
and Stulz (1997). For Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that language matters in an 
investor’s portfolio allocation. Finnish investors whose native language is Swedish are more 
likely to own stocks of companies in Finland that have annual reports in Swedish and whose 
CEOs speak Swedish than those investors whose native language is Finnish. For Korea, Choe 
et al (2001) find that foreign investors buy at higher prices than resident investors and sell at 
lower prices. Kim and Wei (2002) find that a significant information asymmetry exists 
between the resident foreign investors and non-resident foreign investors. They base their 
finding by testing the hypothesis that non-resident foreign investors may herd more than 
resident foreign investors like Korean subsidiaries and branches of foreign institutions as the 
latter have more timely information about the country they live in. Hau (2001) finds that 
proprietary trades on the German stock market do better when they are geographically closer to 
Frankfurt. For US, Ahearne et al. (2004) test the home bias puzzle by employing the data on 
US holdings of foreign equities. They find that information cost is a major determinant of a 
country’s weight in US investor’s portfolio. For Australia, Mishra and Daly (2006) state that 
the major determinants of Australia’s geographical allocation of portfolio investment indicate a 
broad correspondence between stock market capitalisation of destination countries and the 
allocation of Australian financial investments but with some deviations from that baseline, 
where the deviations are correlated with Australian trade patterns. Mishra (2007) examines the 
bilateral, source and host factors driving portfolio equity investment across a set of countries 
using CPIS data on international equity holdings at the end of 1997, 2001 and 2002. He states 
that the bilateral equity investment is strongly correlated with the underlying patterns of trade 
in goods and services. The information asymmetries and cultural-institutional proximity are 
important for bilateral equity investment. The size of domestic stock market is the key 
correlate of aggregate foreign portfolio equity asset and liability holdings. The scale of 
aggregate foreign equity asset holdings is larger for richer countries.  
 
Kho et al (2006) find that the home bias of US investors decreased the most towards countries 
in which the ownership by corporate insiders is low and countries in which ownership by 
corporate insiders fell. Using firm-level data for Korea, they find that portfolio equity 
investment by foreign investors in Korean firms is inversely related to insider ownership and 
that the firms that attract the most foreign portfolio equity investment are large firms with 
dispersed ownership. Dahlquist et al (2003) show that home bias is closely linked to corporate 
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governance. They show that US investors underweight those foreign countries in their 
portfolios which have closely held firms. They construct an estimate of the world float 
portfolio. They also analyse Swedish firm level data on foreign ownership and closely held 
shares and show that the weight of a Swedish firm in the portfolio of foreign investors is 
inversely related to the fraction of firm held by controlling share holders.   
 
3. Float adjusted Home Bias  
Suppose the source country is i  and the host country is j . Share of si′  equity in country j  
( )I ji  is the ratio of si′ holdings of country j  equities to country si′  total equity portfolio. 
           I ji   =   Country holdings of country si′ j  equities   (1) 
 
Country  total equity portfolio si′
Country  total equity portfolio = Investment by country si′ si′  residents in home equities + 
Investment by country  residents in foreign equities.      (2) si′
 
In this paper, country i  is the source country, Australia. In other words, Australia’s total equity 
portfolio is investment by resident Australians in home equities plus investment by Australians 
in foreign countries.  
 
Investment by country  residents in home equities = Country si′ si′  market capitalisation - 
Country  equities held by foreign investors.      (3) si′
 
In other words, investment by resident Australians in home equities = Australia’s market 
capitalisation - Australia’s equities held by other countries. The market capitalisation value is 
determined from Federation Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs (FIBV) database of World 
Stock Exchanges. The equity data is from IMF’s CPIS dataset on cross border portfolio equity 
investment for the years 2001 to 2005. Appendix A lists those countries whose cross border 
equity investment (CPIS data) in Australia and Australia’s equity investment abroad, is 
available over the years 2001 to 2005.  
 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) models are based on perfect markets. Their models assume 
that investment and consumption opportunity sets do not differ across countries and that 
investors are the same across countries with respect to risk aversion and information. There are 
no barriers to international investment, no restrictions on short sales, no taxes, no information 
asymmetries and no tariffs. The traditional ICAPM model suggests that to maximize risk 
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adjusted returns, investors should hold equities from countries around the world in proportion 
to their market capitalisation.  
 
It follows that share of country equities invested in countrysi′ j  ( )I j* , is the ratio of market 
capitalisation of country j  in the world market capitalisation.  
I j∗  = 
world
j
MC
MC
          (4) 
where  is the market capitalisation of country jMC j  and  is the world market 
capitalisation. This ratio is the benchmark of portfolio holdings to which the actual portfolio 
share is compared. 
worldMC
 
Ahearne et al (2004) employ the traditional approach to measure home bias in United States. 
The equity home bias is the deviation from the ICAPM benchmark, defined as one minus the 
ratio of foreign equities in the US and world portfolios.  
ijHomeBias     =        ∗−
j
j
i
I
I
1                     (5)    
     
The traditional theory of home bias calculates the world market portfolio assuming that all 
shares issued by a corporation could potentially be held by foreign investors. Dahlquist et al 
(2003) state that in countries with poor investor protection, firms tend to controlled by large 
share holders so that foreigners can hold only a small portion of issued shares that are freely 
traded or floated. Firms outside the United States are typically controlled by large resident 
shareholders (La Porta et al (1999)). These large resident share holders are the controlling 
share holders, who only sell their shares as a control bloc for a price significantly above the 
open market share trade prices. Shares held by the controlling share holders are also known as 
closely held shares. The controlling share holder would not sell his shares without being paid a 
premium to reflect the benefits he derives from control. The controlling share holders may be 
officers, directors, and their immediate families, shares held in trusts, shares held by pension 
benefit plans, and shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. 
The Japanese closely held shares represent the holdings of the ten largest shareholders.  
 
Suppose the controlling share holders insider ownership is .α  Portfolio investors can only 
hold shares in a firm, not held by the controlling shareholders. Portfolio investors (or non-
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insiders) can hold ( )α−1  of the firm. Foreign investors can only hold a fraction a of the share 
held by non-insiders. Foreign investors hold ( )α−1a  of the firm if they have no home bias.     
Dahlquist et al (2003) state that portfolio investors cannot hold the world market portfolio, but 
can only hold the world market portfolio of shares not held by insiders; which is also known as 
the float adjusted world market portfolio. If all investors hold the float adjusted world market 
portfolio, then as insider holdings fall, foreign investors can buy a fraction of shares sold by 
insiders equal to the weight of the country in the float adjusted world market portfolio. But if 
foreign investors do not hold the float adjusted world market portfolio, then there is no 
necessary relation between a change in insider ownership and a change in shares held by 
foreign investors because all the shares sold by insiders could be bought by local investors.    
 
This paper calculates the float adjusted portfolio for countries and also float adjusted world 
market portfolio from DataStream’s Worldscope database. The float adjusted market 
capitalisation for a country is the sum of the values of free float market capitalisation for all the 
firms in that country. Free float market capitalisation is free float number of shares multiplied 
by the latest available share price, in millions of currency units. Free float number of shares is 
the percentage of total shares in issue available to ordinary investors i.e. the total number of 
shares less the closely held shares. Appendix B provides annual data on the number of firms 
with free float market value.  
 
∑=
m
jmj MVFFMVFF         (6) 
where  is the float adjusted market capitalization for country jMVFF j ,  is the free 
float market capitalization of firm m  in country 
jmMVFF
j  and ∑
m
jmMVFF  is the sum of free float 
market capitalisation of all firms in country j . 
 
∑=
j
jworld MVFFMVFF         (7) 
where  is the sum of free float market capitalisation for the countries in the world. 
Appendix B lists the countries whose free float market capitalisation data is used for 
calculating the world float adjusted market capitalisation.  
∑
j
jMVFF
 
Upon incorporating free float measures, equation (4) becomes 
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I jFF∗ ,  = 
world
j
MVFF
MVFF
         (8) 
 
Finally, the free float home bias measure is 
ijFFHomeBias ,     =        ∗−
jFF
j
iFF
I
I
,
,1        (9) 
where  is the float adjusted measure of home bias,  is the float adjusted 
measure of country 
ijFFHomeBias ,
j
iFFI ,
si′  equity holdings in country j  and  is float adjusted world market 
portfolio of country  
∗
jFFI ,
j . 
 
Home bias is equivalent to normalizing source country holdings in host country by the 
country’s float market capitalisation and then dividing by the share of host country holdings in 
the worldwide float market capitalisation. The empirical analysis in this paper employs the 
float adjusted home bias measure for the years 2001 to 2005.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Table 1 presents Australia’s float adjusted home bias measure as of December 2004. Column 
(1) of the table presents Australian investors’ actual portfolio share as of December 2004. The 
actual portfolio share is the foreign equity holdings of Australia in other countries relative to 
Australia’s total holdings of foreign and domestic equities. Column (1) indicates that 
Australia’s actual percent portfolio share is the highest in US (11.07) followed by UK (1.74), 
Japan (1.66), Netherlands (1.22) and then, the remaining countries of the world. Column (2) of 
the table presents the theoretical portfolio share i.e. shares of country’s float market 
capitalization in the world float market capitalization. It shows the shares of Australia’s equity 
holdings by country under the assumption that investors choose portfolios based on the 
standard portfolio theory. Column (3) compares the actual share of domestic equities held by 
Australians in other countries with the benchmark share in the world portfolio as per ICAPM 
model. This comparison gives an indication of the degree to which Australian investors’ 
underweight different foreign countries. Column (3) clearly indicates that there is a significant 
amount of variation in values across countries and Australian holdings are less than those 
predicted by ICAPM. The ratio is 0.66 for Netherlands indicating that Australian investors 
holding of stocks from Netherlands at end-2004 was 66 percent of what traditional portfolio 
theory would have predicted. The degree of underweighting is more severe against countries 
like Czech Republic (0.03) where Australian investors hold 3 percent of the shares predicted 
by traditional ICAPM levels. Column (4) indicates the measure of home bias as per equation 
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(9). A greater value of home bias measure corresponds to a lower weight in Australia relative 
to world portfolios and thus, a higher degree of bias.  
 
 
 
4. Determinants of Home Bias and some stylized facts 
Some of the possible sources of home bias in the Australian investors equity holdings may be 
due to explicit costs, proximity costs, regulatory and corporate governance information costs, 
trade and diversification motives. These sources of home bias are discussed below: 
 
4.1 Explicit Costs  
Black (1974), Stulz (1981), Cooper and Kaplanis (1986), Aherane et al (2004) state that 
investors face explicit costs related to equity investment viz. transaction fees, taxes, 
commissions and the costs of gathering information.   
 
(i) Transaction Costs ( )jnCostTransactio  
Home bias can arise due to high transaction costs associated with trading foreign equities. The 
transaction cost data is derived from Elkins-McSherry Co. (www.elkins-mcsherry.com). 
Elkins-McSherry Co. receives trade data on all global trades by institutional traders and 
computes measures of trading costs. The data consists of average trading costs as a percentage 
of trade value for active managers in a universe of 42 countries. The data are quarterly, from 
the last quarter of 1995 through the fourth quarter of 2006. In 1998, the institutional traders in 
the data represented 136 firms, of which 105 were pension funds, 27 were investment 
managers, and 4 were brokers. These institutions accounted for 28 billion shares in 632,547 
trades, using 700 global managers and 1000 brokers (Domowitz et al 2001).  
 
The transaction cost comprises of three cost components viz. commissions, fees and market 
impact costs. This paper takes into account the total cost comprising of all the three cost 
components for the end quarter of years 2001 to 2005. Investors would underweight high 
transaction cost countries in their portfolios and accordingly, this variable is expected to have 
positive impact on the measure of home bias. 
 
4.2  Proximity Costs  
Mishra (2007), Mishra and Daly (2006), Sarkissian and Schill (2004), Aviat and Coeurdacier 
(2004), Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), Portes et al (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001) and Portes and Rey (2005) find that distance and language play a dominant role in 
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investors preference for equity investment. The following section discusses two proximity 
measures of home bias: distance and language. 
 
 
 
(i)  Distance  ( )ijDist  
Geographical distance is a barrier to interaction among economic agents and cultural exchange. 
Investors prefer investing in countries which are in geographic proximity due to lower 
information costs arising from cultural similarities and familiarity. The paper employs 
logarithm of distance value obtained from Indo.com2 site. Indo.com uses data from US census 
and a supplementary list of cities around the world to find latitude and longitude of two places 
and then calculates distance between them (as the crow flies). This variable is expected to have 
a positive impact on the measure of home bias.  
 
(ii)  Language ( )ijLanguage  
ijLanguage  is the common language dummy variable which is equal to one if source and host 
country share a common language; otherwise its value is zero. Investors prefer to invest in 
foreign countries that share a common language with their home country. Common language 
may better enable investors to read company financial reports and financial press analysis. This 
may enhance investors’ familiarity with destination countries’ financial system and thus reduce 
investors’ information costs. Data on language is from the World Factbook 20063 which 
reports the official, major and unofficial languages from all over the world. Countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand, UK and US share English as a common language; while Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, South Korea and Indonesia have their own languages. This variable is expected to 
have a negative impact on the measure of home bias.  
 
4.3 Regulatory and Corporate Governance Information Costs 
The cross country differences in accounting practices, disclosure requirements and regulatory 
environments give rise to information asymmetries between local and foreign investors. This 
paper investigates the impact of host countries’ regulatory environments and corporate 
governance standards on Australia’s home bias. These legal and governance indices are 
                                                 
2 http://www.indo.com/distance/ 
3 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/  
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expected to have a negative impact on Australia’s home bias. A brief description of these legal 
and governance indices is provided below: 
 
 
 
4.3.1 La Porta et al (1998) legal indicators 
This paper considers legal origin dummy, efficiency of judicial system indices and rule of law 
indices from La Porta et al (1998) to investigate their impact on home bias. 
 
(i) Legal Origin ( )  LO
Common origin to the legal system uses a dummy variable for similarity in institutions. This 
paper assigns a dummy value of 1 if the source and host country have the same legal origin 
otherwise it is zero. Laws in different countries are typically not written from scratch, but 
rather transplanted from a few legal families or traditions. In general, commercial laws come 
from two broad traditions: common law, which is English in origin and civil law, which 
derives from Roman law. The modern commercial laws originate from the three major families 
French, German and Scandinavian, in the civil law tradition. The three major law tradition 
families that have global impact are English common law and the French and German civil 
law. In case of individual countries, the resulting laws reflect both the influence of their 
families and country specific law characteristics. This variable is expected to have a positive 
impact on foreign equity holdings. 
 
(ii) Efficiency of judicial system  ( )EFF
The efficiency of judicial system index is developed by the country risk rating agency Business 
International Corporation. This index assesses the efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms. It may be taken to represent 
investors’ assessments of conditions in the country in question. This index scales from 0 to 10, 
with lower scores for lower efficiency levels and is averaged over the period from 1980 to 
1983. In this paper, the efficiency of judicial system index has the lowest value (3.25) for 
Thailand and the highest value (10) for US, UK, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore, 
Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway. This variable is expected to have a negative 
impact on Australia’s equity home bias. 
 
(iii) Rule of law ( )  ROL
Rule of law index is developed by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk 
(ICR) and it assesses the law and order tradition in the country. This index scales from 0 to 10, 
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with lower scores for less tradition for law and order and is average of the months of April and 
October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. In this paper, the rule of law index has 
the lowest value (4.2) for South Africa and the highest value (10) for US, UK, Japan, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Singapore, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand and Norway. This variable is expected to have a negative impact on Australia’s equity 
home bias. 
 
4.3.2  Kaufmann et al (2006) governance indicators 
Kaufmann et al (2006) indicators describe various aspects of the governance structures of a 
broad cross-section of countries. The indicators have been constructed on the basis of 
information gathered through a wide variety of cross-country surveys as well as polls of 
experts. The indicators cover 213 countries and territories for 1996, 1998 and 2000, and 
annually for 2002 to 2005. In 2005, they estimate the indicators on 276 individual variables 
measuring different dimension of governance, by employing 31 different datasets from 24 
different sources. They construct six indicators each representing a different dimension of 
governance viz. voice and accountability, political instability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory burden, rule of law and graft. The variables are standardized to have a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one. The larger the values, the better they indicate their institutional 
quality.  
 
Voice and accountability  index focuses on various indicators related to political 
process, civil rights, and institutions that facilitate citizen control of government actions, such 
as media independence. Political stability and lack of violence 
(VACC)
( )PS  index combines 
indicators that measure the risk of a destabilization or removal from power of the government 
in a violent or unconstitutional way.  
 
Government Effectiveness  index comprises of indicators that measure the quality of 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the quality of public service provision and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to its policies. Regulatory Quality (  index 
consists of indicators related to the regulations of exports, imports, business ownerships, 
equities ownerships, banking, foreign investment, price controls, tariffs, unfair competitive 
practices etc.  
(GE)
)
)
RQ
 
Rule of Law  index measures concepts related to enforceability of government and 
private contracts, fairness of judicial process, speediness of judicial process, violent and 
(RL
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organised crimes, trust in legal system, patent and copyright protection etc. Control of 
Corruption  index focuses on the measure of corruption within the political system, the 
rate of severity of corruption within the state, the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy, 
corruption among public officials etc. Average 
(CC)
( )AVE  is the average of the Kaufmann et al 
(2006) governance indicators. Average takes into account the effect of various governance 
dimensions that determine simultaneously the location of portfolio equity investment.  
 
4.4 Trade and Diversification   
Mishra (2007) and Lane and Milesi Feretti (2004) state that bilateral equity investment is 
strongly correlated with the underlying patterns of trade in goods and services. This paper 
examines the impact of trade on Australian investors’ equity home bias.  
 
Bohn and Tesar (1996) state that investors are momentum traders or return chasers, who base 
their equity investment decisions on the stock markets past performance. They state that 
investors tend to move into markets where returns are expected to be high and retreat from 
markets when predicted returns are low. This paper examines the investors diversification 
motives on Australia’s equity home bias.  
 
4.4.1  Trade ( )ijTrade  
 Trade  is the average of imports and exports normalised by the destination country’s GDP. 
This measure is in accordance with Aherane et al (2004). Australian investors are better 
informed about those foreign firms, with which Australia has trading relations. Australian 
investors are better able to attain accounting and regulatory information on foreign markets 
through trade. Consequently, investors may be inclined to hold the stocks of foreign companies 
with whose products they are most familiar. This variable is expected to have a negative 
impact on the measure of home bias. The data on imports and exports is taken from IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics and GDP data is from World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators.       
 
4.4.2 Diversification Motives 
This paper employs two measures i.e. covariance and reward to risk ratio to investigate the 
diversification motives of Australian investors. 
 
(i) Covariance ( )ijCOV  
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The financial economics literature suggests that the greater the comovements between financial 
assets of two countries, the lower the benefit of diversification. When the correlation between 
source country and host country is small, source country investors enjoy a larger diversification 
gain from investing in host country; they have greater desire to increase their equity holdings 
in host country. Therefore the degree of home bias of source country for host country will be 
smaller.  The covariance between source and host country is computed using return data from 
DataStream’s Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). The return data is calculated from 
MSCI monthly stock market indices for months ranging from January 1995 to December 2005.  
 
(ii) Reward to risk ratio ( )jRR  
Reward to risk ratio is the ratio of mean monthly return to standard deviation. This measure is 
in accordance with Ahearne et al (2004). Investors might tend to underweight those countries 
in their portfolios, whose stock markets have performed poorly, based on their information of 
past stock returns. This variable is expected to have negative impact on the measure of home 
bias. The return data is calculated from Datastream’s Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) monthly stock market indices for months ranging from January 1995 to December 
2005.  
 
5. Empirical Specification  
This paper is based on Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) theoretical framework. They derive 
efficient portfolios in a world where there are barriers to cross border investment, which 
depend both on the domicile of the investor and his country of investment. This paper regresses 
the measure of home bias (discussed in section 3) on a vector of explanatory variables that 
includes explicit costs, proximity costs, regulatory and corporate governance information costs, 
trade and diversification motives (discussed in section 4).   
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) jijjijij
ijjjFFij
COVRRTradeLanguage
DisnCostTransactiotrolCapitalConHomeBias
χαααα
αααα
++++
++++=
7654
3210
 (10)                                   
 
where : Float adjusted measure of home bias, : Capital 
control measure of destination country, : Transaction cost associated with 
share trading in destination country, : Distance in kilometre between capital city of 
source and host country, : Common language dummy with value equal to one if 
source and host country have same language otherwise the value is zero, : Trade is the 
FFijHomeBias jtrolCapitalCon
jnCostTransactio
ijDis
ijLanguage
ijTrade
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average of imports and exports normalised by the destination country’s GDP, : Reward to 
risk is the ratio of destination country’s mean monthly return to standard deviation, : 
Covariance of monthly returns of source and host country,
jRR
ijCOV
jχ : random error term. 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) jFFij LOROLEFFHomeBias εββββ ++++= 3210                                        (11)   
where EFF : Efficiency of judicial system, : Rule of law, : Legal origin dummy 
with value equal to 1 if source and host country have the same legal origin otherwise it is 0, 
ROL LO
jε : random error term. EFF ,  and  indices are from La Porta et al (1998). ROL LO
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) j
ijFFij
AVE
CCRLRQGEPSVACCTradeHomeBias
ωγ
γγγγγγγγ
+
++++++++=
8
76543210
                        (12) 
where : Trade is the average of imports and exports normalised by the destination 
country’s GDP, VACC : Voice and Accountability, : Political Stability and Lack of 
Violence, : Government Effectiveness, : Regulatory Quality, 
ijTrade
PS
GE RQ RL : Rule of Law, CC : 
Control of Corruption, : Average, AVE jω : random error terms. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
The empirical results are based on panel regression of equations (10) to (12), for the years 
2001 to 2005. Appendix A gives the list of host countries for the years 2001 to 2005. Only 
those countries are included for which cross border equity investment in Australia and 
Australia’s equity investment abroad are available from CPIS.   
[TABLE 2] 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the paper. The measure of 
home bias is negatively related to trade, language dummy and reward to risk ratio; and 
positively related to distance, transaction cost and covariance. Overall, the correlation matrix 
does not indicate serious correlation among the variables. 
[TABLE 3] 
Table 3 indicates the panel regression results of Australia’s home bias measure by regressing 
home bias variable against the independent variables i.e. trade, distance, language and 
transaction cost. In column (1), trade variable enters significantly at the 10 percent level with a 
negative sign, implying that Australian investors prefer investing in countries with which 
Australia has trade relationships. Countries that trade with each other tend to learn more about 
one other’s culture, legal and financial environment, and current accounting practices etc. This 
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facilitates portfolio equity investment among the countries and consequently reduces equity 
home bias. The transaction cost variable is positive and significant at 1 percent level. However, 
the value of transaction cost variable is very low (0.00) which implies that it does not have a 
major influence on Australia’s equity investment.  
 
Column (2) indicates regression results where the independent variables are trade, language 
and transaction cost. Language variable is significant at 1 percent level and is negative. This 
implies that Australian investors prefer investing in English speaking countries. Speaking a 
common language English, enables Australian investors to better understand the financial 
system and regulatory environment of the host countries thus facilitating their investments. In 
2004; Australia’s equity investment in English speaking countries was around 69 % of its total 
crosses border equity investment (author’s own calculations based on IMF’s CPIS dataset for 
2004). The trade variable is still negative but losses significance from 5 percent to 10 percent. 
This suggests that some of the contribution from trade may reflect lower information costs 
which are also captured through common language. The transaction cost variable is still 
positive and significant at 1 percent level. However, the value of transaction cost variable is 
very low (0.00) which implies that it does not have a major impact on Australian investors’ 
equity home bias.  
 
Column (3) indicates the impact of distance and transaction cost on home bias. Distance 
variable is positive and significant at 10 percent. Investors prefer investing in countries which 
are in geographic proximity due to low information costs. The major equity investment 
destinations of Australia are United States and United Kingdom, which are located at greater 
distances as compared to some Asian countries. Mishra and Daly (2006) state that Asian 
financial markets are not well developed. Australian investors prefer United States and United 
Kingdom because these countries are among the world’s largest economies with major shares 
of the world’s share and bond markets. The transaction cost variable is positive and significant 
at 1 percent level; however it’s very low value (0.00) further confirms that it does not have a 
major influence on Australia’s equity investment.  
 [TABLE 4] 
Table 4 indicates the regression results for diversification motives of Australian investors. 
Column (1) includes trade, transaction cost and covariance as the independent variables. 
Covariance variable is used to test the diversification motive. If transactions occur because of 
diversification motive, the covariance variable should be significant because greater the 
comovements between financial assets of two countries, the lower the benefit of 
diversification. Covariance is positive but insignificant. This indicates low diversification 
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motives of investors. Trade variable enters with a negative sign and is significant at 5 percent. 
Transaction cost variable is positive and significant at 5 percent.  
 
Column (2) includes trade, transaction cost and reward to risk ratio as the independent 
variables. Reward to risk ratio is employed instead of covariance, as a robustness check to 
investigate the diversification motive. If portfolio decisions were based on past returns, then 
Australian investors might tend to underweight countries’ whose stock markets have 
performed poorly. The reward to risk ratio variable is negative and significant at 5 percent. 
This indicates return chasing behaviour of Australian investors. This is in accordance to the 
finding of Brennan and Cao (1997) who state that when domestic investors of country j  have 
cumulative information advantage in the domestic market, the trade of foreign investors in 
market j  is positively related to the return of country j . This happens because foreign 
investors revise the means of their predictive distributions according to the realized public 
signals by more than the better informed domestic investors do. Again, trade and transaction 
cost variables are significant and maintain their sign as per column (1).  
 
Column (3) includes trade, language, transaction cost and covariance as the independent 
variables. Covariance is positive and insignificant which implies low diversification motive of 
Australian investors. Language is negative and significant at 5 percent. Trade is negative but 
losses significance from 5 percent to 10 percent. This further reinforces that some of the 
contribution from trade may reflect lower information costs which are also captured through 
common language. Transaction cost variable is positive and significant; however its value is 
very low (0.00). This further provides support that transaction cost has low impact on 
Australia’s equity home bias.  
 
As a robustness check, column (4) replaces covariance variable of column (3) with reward to 
risk ratio variable; other independent variables i.e. trade, language and transaction cost are 
similar to those in column (3). The reward to risk ratio variable is negative and significant at 10 
percent. This suggests return chasing behaviour of Australian investors. Trade, language and 
transaction cost variables have similar sign and significance as those in column (3). 
 
Overall results of table 4 confirm Australia’s equity investment in English speaking destination 
countries and also Australian investors not driven primarily by diversification motives. The 
results are in accordance with Sarkissian and Schill (2004) and Aviat and Couerdacier (2004). 
[TABLE 5] 
 18
Table 5 illustrates the impact of La Porta et al (1998) indices i.e. rule of law, efficiency of 
judicial system and legal origin dummy on home bias in the Australian context. Column (1) 
examines the effect of rule of law index on home bias. Rule of law variable is negative and 
significant. This implies that Australian investors less underweight countries with high 
tradition of law and order in their portfolios. Column (2) investigates the impact of efficiency 
of judicial system on home bias. Efficiency of judicial system variable is negative and 
significant. This suggests that Australian investors weight those countries in their portfolios 
which have efficient judicial system. Finally, column (3) examines the effect of legal origin 
dummy variable on home bias. Legal origin dummy variable is negative and significant. This 
suggests that Australian investors weight countries having similar culture and origin in their 
portfolios. Investors are better able to better understand the legal and regulatory environment 
of the countries having same legal origin as their own and accordingly prefer to invest in those 
countries.   
[TABLE 6] 
Table 6 presents the regression results that indicate the impact of World Bank governance 
indicators on home bias, with trade as the control variable. In table 6, trade variable enters 
significantly with a negative sign, confirming that Australian investors prefer investing in 
countries with which Australia has trade relationships. Column (1) indicates that voice and 
accountability variable is negative and significant at 1 percent level. This implies that civil 
liberties and degree of democratic accountability have significant impact on Australian 
investors cross border equity investment. Column (2) indicates that political stability indicator 
is negative and significant at 10 percent level. This implies that perceptions about 
destabilization of a government due to political instability and violence play a role on 
Australian investors cross border equity investment. Column (3) indicates that government 
effectiveness indicator is negative and significant. This implies that Australian investors weight 
those countries in their portfolios which have quality of civil service, public service, policy 
formulation and implementation and credibility of government’s commitment to such policies. 
Column (4) indicates that regulatory quality indicator is negative and significant. This implies 
that Australian investors weight those countries in their portfolios whose governments are able 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. The rule of law indicator in column (5) is negative and significant. This 
implies that Australian investors weight those countries in their portfolios which have high 
quality of contract enforcement, police and courts; and fairness of judicial process. In column 
(6), the control of corruption indicator is negative and significant. This implies that Australian 
investors weight those countries in their portfolios which have regulatory framework to check 
and control corruption. Columns (1) to (6) illustrate the individual effects of various 
institutional variables. However, if various institutional dimensions determine simultaneously 
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the location of portfolio equity investment, then by including them individually might lead to 
an omitted variable bias. Therefore, column (7) indicates the effect of governance indicators 
grouped together (average) on home bias. The average of governance indicators variable is 
negative and significant. This implies that Australian investors weight those countries in their 
portfolios which have proper corporate governance system in place.   
 
Overall, results of Table 5 and Table 6 suggest that better governance in the destination 
countries would lead to an increase of Australian investors’ equity investment. Investors 
weight countries in their portfolios which have efficient governing systems, high tradition of 
law and order, transparent corporate governance, effective policies related to trade and 
development, and regulatory system for control of corruption.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper employs IMF’s high quality CPIS dataset on cross border equity investment to 
investigate the determinants of equity home bias in the Australian context. The data itself 
indicates some interesting stylized facts about the home bias puzzle. 
 
The traditional studies on home bias assume that investors can hold world market portfolio. 
However, in a world with controlling share holders; portfolio investors can only hold the world 
portfolio of shares that are not available to controlling shareholders (world float portfolio). 
This paper constructs the float measure of home bias for the years 2001 to 2005 and explores 
the determinants of Australia’s equity home bias.  
 
Trade links are found to have a negative and significant impact on home bias; implying that 
trade alleviates certain information asymmetries in terms of familiarity with the financial and 
legal environment of the countries; cultural barriers etc. Information flows positively affect 
both cross-border finance and trade. Trade in goods and trade in assets become 
complementary: firm managers learn about each other by trading goods and/or securities. 
Trading in goods market reduces informational asymmetries in the financial markets (and vice 
versa). 
 
This paper finds that Australian investors exhibit a preference for common language (English 
speaking) and common legal origin countries. Investors acquire useful information about 
familiar firms from reading company statements in a language they understand, from general 
or acquired knowledge about local fims, or from the cultural groups they socialize within. The 
information based theory of the influence of language, culture and legal origin leads to more 
active trading of these familiar firms and generates superior performance in these firms.  
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 This paper finds low diversification motives of Australian investors. Transaction costs are 
positive and statistically significant; however their values are very low.    
 
This paper also investigates the impact of destination countries legal and governance 
environment on Australia’s home bias. Investors weight countries in their portfolios which 
have efficient governing systems, high tradition of law and order, transparent corporate 
governance and effective policies related to trade and development.  
 
Overall the results indicate that both regulations and information costs have impact on 
Australia’s cross border equity holdings. Even among countries for which regulatory barriers 
to foreign equity holdings are small, cultural barriers seem to constitute quite significant barrier 
to equity holdings. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse causes for the home bias in the Australian context 
and to derive implications from these findings for economic policy. This paper finds that even 
if policy induced barriers to equity flows have been lifted, there remain substantial economic 
or market inherent barriers. These barriers tend to remain relevant and to affect the way in 
which financial systems operate and integrate even if economic policy has reduced regulatory 
barriers to entry. The asymmetries in information between domestic and foreign investors, 
which can arise from differences in regulatory environments, are of primary importance. The 
market inherent barriers due to fixed costs of market entry including transaction costs do not 
have a major impact in the Australian context.  
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Appendix A: Countries  
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Hong Kong 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Malaysia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Brazil 
Hong Kong 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Hong Kong 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
Germany 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Thailand 
UK 
US 
Canada 
Luxembourg 
Austria 
Hong Kong 
Czech Republic 
Finland 
Germany 
Japan 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Turkey 
UK 
US 
Luxembourg 
 
Note: Table includes only those countries for which CPIS data on countries equity investment 
in Australia and Australia’s equity investment in these countries is available. 
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Appendix B: Number of Firms in respective countries for calculation of free float market 
capitalisation  
 
Countries Number of firms Countries Number of firms 
Australia 
Austria 
Brazil 
France  
Canada 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
Chile  
Israel 
Thailand 
Singapore 
Philippines 
Malaysia 
South Korea 
Japan 
Indonesia 
India 
Hong Kong 
China 
Bangladesh 
Turkey  
Switzerland 
Sweden 
Spain 
Russia 
Romania 
Portugal 
Poland 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Luxembourg 
Lithuania 
Italy 
Ireland 
1483 
94 
330 
874 
1441 
25 
172 
146 
198 
549 
353 
667 
198 
596 
1001 
3830 
228 
706 
1057 
1152 
5  
162 
378 
330 
158 
148 
51 
72 
189 
177 
146 
36 
41 
289 
56 
Hungary 
Greece 
Zimbabwe 
South Africa 
Morocco 
Mauritius 
Kenya 
UK 
US 
New Zealand 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Germany 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Taiwan 
Egypt 
Argentina 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Peru 
Estonia 
Slovak Republic 
Malta 
Slovenia 
Iceland 
33 
303 
21 
363 
31 
7 
11 
1840 
1130 
132 
208 
4 
4 
25 
451 
32 
50 
1175 
46 
49 
14 
2 
122 
10 
82 
15 
5 
14 
7 
7 
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Note: Data on the number of firms is per year. Data on number of firms for Czech Republic, 
Bangladesh, Mauritius and Iceland correspond to market capitalization as float adjusted market 
capitalization is not available for these countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Australia’s portfolio equity investment (2004) 
 
 
Country 
(1) 
Actual share in 
Australia’s equity 
portfolio 
(2) 
Benchmark 
share in world 
float market 
capitalisation 
(3) 
Actual over 
Benchmark 
(4) 
ijFFHomeBias ,  
 
 
Austria 0.026 0.147 0.176 0.824 
Canada 0.354 2.462 0.143 0.857 
Czech Republic 0.001 0.035 0.030 0.970 
Denmark 0.061  0.373 0.164 0.836 
Finland 0.065 0.631 0.103 0.897 
Germany 0.525 2.444 0.215 0.785 
Hong Kong 0.288 2.612 0.110 0.890 
Japan 1.661 11.719 0.141 0.859 
Korea 0.184 0.817 0.226 0.774 
Luxembourg 0.005 0.151 0.033 0.967 
Malaysia 0.023 0.322 0.073 0.927 
Netherlands 1.227 1.834 0.669 0.331 
New Zealand 0.058 0.095 0.609 0.391 
Norway 0.054 0.198 0.272 0.728 
Singapore 0.122 0.765 0.160 0.840 
South Africa 0.035 0.863 0.041 0.959 
Spain 0.193 2.721 0.071 0.929 
Sweden 0.139 1.122 0.123 0.877 
Thailand 0.025 0.254 0.098 0.902 
UK 1.746 4.573 0.381 0.619 
US 11.076 32.836           0.337 0.663 
 
Source: Foreign equity investments from the IMF’s CPIS, market capitalizations from FIBV. 
(Author’s own calculation). 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix (2001 to 2005) 
 
 ijFFHBIAS ,  ijTrade  ijDIS  ijLan  jTC  ijRR  ijCOV
  -0.20 0.14 -0.35 0.21 -0.10 
 
 
0.01 ijFFHBIAS ,
ijTrade    -0.89 0.34 0.20 -0.36 
 
0.20 
ijDIS     -0.29 -0.23 0.38 
 
-0.37 
ijLan      -0.03 0.04 
 
-0.01 
jTC       -0.15 
 
0.54 
ijRR        -0.24 
ijCOV         
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White 
corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. : Float adjusted home bias measure, : 
Capital control measure of destination country, : Transaction cost associated with share 
trading in destination country, : Distance in kilometre between capital city of source 
country and host country, : Common language dummy with value equal to one if source 
and host country have same language otherwise the value is zero, : Trade is the 
average of imports and exports normalised by the destination country’s GDP, : Reward to 
risk is the ratio of destination country’s mean monthly return to standard deviation, : 
Covariance of monthly returns between source country and destination country. 
ijFFHBIAS , jCC
jTC
ijDIS
ijLan
ijTrade
ijRR
ijCOV
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Table 3: Australia’s Home Bias (2001 to 2005) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ijTrade  
-0.01** 
(-2.43) 
-0.01*** 
(-1.68) 
 
ijDis  
  0.14*** 
(1.65) 
ijLan  
 -0.07* 
(-2.65) 
 
jTC  
0.00* 
(3.52) 
0.00* 
(3.33) 
0.00* 
(2.90) 
Constant 0.68* 
(15.62) 
0.72* 
(15.67) 
0.08 
(0.23) 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.17 0.07 
Observation 108 108 108 
 
Note: Refer note of Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of diversification on Australia’s Home Bias (2001 to 2005) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ijTrade  
-0.01** 
(-2.50) 
-0.02* 
(-2.93) 
-0.01*** 
(-1.71) 
-0.01** 
(-2.03) 
ijLan  
  -0.07** 
(-2.54) 
-0.07** 
(-2.36) 
jTC  
0.00** 
(2.51) 
0.00* 
(3.32) 
0.00* 
(2.87) 
0.00* 
(3.22) 
ijRR  
 -0.25** 
(-2.26) 
 -0.18*** 
(-1.69) 
ijCOV  
0.00 
(0.79) 
 0.00 
(0.33) 
 
Constant 0.67* 
(15.15) 
0.72* 
(16.32) 
0.71* 
(14.59) 
0.74* 
(17.07) 
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.18 
Observation 108 108 108 108 
 
Note: Refer note of Table 2. 
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Table 5: Effect of Legal Indices on Home Bias (2001 to 2005) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ROL  -0.02* 
(-4.31) 
  
EFF   -0.02* 
(-2.63) 
 
LO    -0.06** 
(-2.08) 
Constant 1.03* 
(22.02) 
0.99* 
(14.85) 
0.83* 
(45.69) 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.05 0.03 
Observation 98 98 108 
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White 
corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. : Rule of law. ROL EFF : Efficiency of judicial system. 
Legal Origin. Legal Indices are from La Porta et al (1998).  :LO
 
 
Table 6: Effect of Governance Indices on Home Bias (2001 to 2005) 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ijTrade  -0.02* 
(-3.81) 
-0.01*** 
(-1.87) 
-0.01*** 
(-1.94) 
-0.01** 
(-2.09) 
-0.01** 
(-2.19) 
-0.01** 
(-2.05) 
-0.01** 
(-2.51) 
VACC  -0.10* 
(-3.15) 
      
PS   -0.04*** 
(-1.74) 
     
GE    -0.10* 
(-4.36) 
    
RQ     -0.11* 
(-3.75) 
   
RL      -0.09* 
(-4.94) 
  
CC       -0.07* 
(-4.81) 
 
AVE        -0.10* 
(-4.66) 
Constant 0.94* 
(23.30) 
0.85* 
(33.77) 
0.97* 
(31.28) 
0.96* 
(26.59) 
 
0.94* 
(40.38) 
0.92* 
(45.81) 
0.95* 
(36.48) 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.09 
Observation 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 
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Note: *,** and **** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White 
corrected t-statistics in parenthesis. : Trade is the average of imports and exports 
normalised by the destination country’s GDP. Voice and Accountability , Political 
Stability and Lack of Violence ( ), Government Effectiveness ( ), Regulatory Quality 
( ), Rule of Law (
ijTrade (VACC)
PS GE
RQ RL ), Control of Corruption (CC ), Average ( )AVE  are governance 
Indices are from Kaufmann et al (2006).  
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